In this paper we do an ex post evaluation of the French tax on air pollution. The revenues of this tax were redistributed to polluters in the form of subsidies to abatement technologies, and the policy is a typical example of an earmarked tax. We use a two-stage estimation procedure on an unbalanced panel data set of 226 plants from three industrial sectors which are some of the main contributors to nitrogen oxide and sulfur dioxide emissions. The results indicate that the overall environmental effectiveness of this particular tax/subsidy scheme can be questioned.
I. INTRODUCTION
Failures in the market for environmental goods, such as those originating from externalities or asymmetric information, call for some regulatory actions. Economists have recommended different sorts of incentive-based instruments to correct for such inefficiencies:
taxes, pollution permits, or subsidies. However, practical implementation of such instruments can be delicate for different reasons: polluters may be difficult to identify, pollution may not be directly measurable, or taxation may run into political constraints (see Buchanan and Tullock 1975, or McKibbin and Wilcoxen 2002 , for a recent application on why it is so difficult to implement a tax or tradeable permits for climate change policy). Actual policies thus frequently differ from what is recommended by theory. The analysis of second-best solutions and the effects that they actually produce are thus necessary guidelines for regulators who very often need to reduce resistance from targeted polluters. An example of such a second-best policy for air pollution can be found in Sweden where the polluters pay a charge on nitrogen oxide (NO x ) emissions and the revenues are returned to the same group of polluters in proportion to their production of useful energy (Sterner 2002) . The French air pollution tax is another example of a revenue-refunded instrument, of which the revenues are allocated to abatement subsidies that benefit the group of targeted polluters. 1 Such systems combining a tax and a subsidy are commonly called "earmarked tax" systems. 2 Existing theoretical analyses of environmental taxes have mainly been concerned with output-based refunding of environmental revenues, and ignored the case when revenue is returned in the form of abatement subsidies. For example, Fischer (2001 Fischer ( , 2003 analyses the case when the revenue from taxes or auctioned tradeable permits is refunded to the firms according to their share of industry output. Although the same marginal incentive for emission reductions holds as under an emission tax, the firm will produce a higher level of output compared to the optimal solution. Consequently, for any given emission rate, outputbased rebating of emission taxes induces less emission reductions than would the optimal policy of a Pigouvian tax. 3 In this sense, the analysis of output-based refunding is similar to the conclusions on the perverse effects of subsidies for abatement, which can lead to excessive entry and a lower output price than what would be socially optimal (Baumol and Oates 1988) . When the output market is imperfectly competitive, however, Gersbach and Requate (2004) show that output-based refunding can improve social welfare.
The contribution of this paper is an empirical analysis of an earmarked tax system, through the ex post evaluation in three industrial sectors of the French system of air pollution taxation with respect to its objective of lowering emissions by subsidizing abatement technologies. In many countries, ex ante evaluations of proposed policies are required, but ex post assessments of the efficiency of a policy after some years of implementation are quite rare. This is preoccupying since studies have found quite large discrepancies between predicted per unit abatement cost and actual costs of a policy, as well as between the predicted emission reduction and the actual emission reduction induced by policy . 4 We wish to contribute to filling this gap, and help inform better policy as to the effects of different designs of environmental taxes. Our analysis uses a nine-year (1990-98) database of 226 plants from three industrial sectors (iron and steel, coke, and chemistry) which are among the main contributors to NO x and sulfur dioxide (SO 2 ) emissions in France. The results of our study indicate that, for these three sectors, the effectiveness of an earmarked tax scheme like that of the French tax on air pollution in the nineties can be questioned. For the three sectors in our sample, the tax had a negative impact on NO x and SO 2 emissions. The combined subsidy, however, generally increased emissions significantly and to an extent that dwarfed the negative impact of the tax. These results contrast with the findings of Höglund (2000) and Sterner and Höglund (2000) regarding the evaluation of the Swedish earmarked emission tax on NO x . In their discussion (there is no econometric analysis) on the effectiveness of the Swedish NO x charge, which is rebated on the basis of energy production, Sterner and Höglund (2000) argue that this policy proved effective as between 1992 and 1998, the 200 Swedish combustion plants that initially were targeted by the regulation reduced their average emission rates by 40%. 5 We conclude our analysis by suggesting an explanation for the difference in effectiveness between the two regulations based on the nature of the abatement subsidy and the emissions monitoring system, rather than just simply a result of the difference in tax rates.
This study contributes to extending the scarce empirical literature on the actual effects of environmental taxes on air pollution, in contrast with the evaluations that have been performed on the US experience of tradeable emission permits, see for example Joskow, Schmalensee and Bailey (1998) , Stavins (1998) and Carlson et al. (2000) on the sulfur emissions market, or Kerr and Newell (2003) on the tradeable permits used to phase out lead in gasoline. The few exceptions of ex post analyses of emission taxes for air pollution are Wang and Wheeler (1996) , Millock and Nauges (2003) , and Bruvoll and Larsen (2004) . Wang and Wheeler (1996) use cross-section data on individual plants in 1993 to estimate the elasticity in the response to the Chinese pollution levy and find an elasticity of emissions of suspended particles (TSP) with respect to the pollution levy equal to -0.65. 6 While Wang and Wheeler (1996) find a significant effect of the Chinese levy on emissions of TSP, Bruvoll and Larsen (2004) found a less optimistic result as concerns the effectiveness of the Norwegian carbon tax. In an evaluation of the Norwegian carbon tax over the period 1990-99 using general equilibrium simulations, they find that the carbon tax accounted only for a small share of emission reductions over the period studied due to the exemptions accorded to several energy-intensive sectors. A preliminary empirical evaluation of the French tax/subsidy scheme is found in Millock and Nauges (2003) who do a simple estimation of the effect of the tax by regressing emissions on the tax rate, the Brent index of oil prices, regional GDP and dummy variables for industrial sector. The elasticity of emissions with respect to the tax rate was found to be significant and equal to -0.15 for NO 2 emissions and -1.40 for SO 2 emissions.
This is a partial estimation of the tax, however, since it does not include the effect of the subsidies paid out of the tax revenues. In addition, we use a different and richer data set here since we have combined the emissions data with further data on individual plant characteristics.
Other studies that are related to this article for their use of ex post data for evaluation of environmental policy are Khanna and Damon (1999) and Björner and Jensen (2002) . Both papers are concerned with the evaluation of a combination of voluntary programs and traditional regulation (norms, or taxes and subsidies). Khanna and Damon (1999) There was no explicit encouragement of one abatement technology over the other, apart from the fact that the percentage subsidy increased with the innovative character of the proposed technology. There was also an additional 10% subsidy for small and medium sized companies.
Examples of technologies that were subsidized for abatement of SO 2 emissions include the injection of alcaline chemicals, combustion on sulfur-removing fluidized beds, and wet and dry flue gas desulfurization. As regards NO x abatement, the regulation subsidized technologies such as exhaust gas recirculation and low NO x burners, selective non-catalyst reduction and selective catalyst reduction. Just as for the SO 2 emissions abatement techniques listed above, these are techniques with quite a varying degree of effectiveness, ranging from 20-95%.
As subsidies were calculated on the basis of the capital cost of investment, however, this may have created a bias towards end-of-pipe technologies, for which the investment costs are easier to quantify than clean technologies that often include management reorganization and possibly higher variable costs. In our sample, 80% of the subsidized equipment was endof-pipe technologies and almost all the plants received a subsidy representing 15% of the overall investment. For that reason, the subsidy rate can be considered as pre-determined for the plant and will be modelled as exogeneous to the firm in the empirical analysis.
An end-of-pipe equipment leads to a reduction of polluting emissions released into the atmosphere without involving any change in the combustion process (contrary to cleantechnology equipment). Even if an end-of-pipe equipment normally targets emissions of a particular pollutant, in some cases emissions from other pollutants can also be abated. This is the case in particular for plants emitting NO x and SO 2 . We will take this feature into account in the empirical model by allowing the abatement equipment to have an impact on both NO x and SO 2 emissions.
It is important to note that virtually all subsidy requests were granted, so the decision to invest in abatement equipment is equivalent to receiving a subsidy. This is also crucial information when one wishes to model a plant's optimization problem as it implies that any plant willing to invest knows that she will get the subsidy with probability one.
In the year 2000, the TPPA was replaced by a general pollution tax 11 levied by the customs authorities and no longer administered by ADEME, who nevertheless continues to handle requests for abatement subsidies paid out of the general government budget. Our analysis encompasses the period when the TPPA was an integrated earmarked tax system.
Given that the tax rate in the French regulation seems to have been lower than the estimated interval of marginal costs of abatement, at least for SO 2 emissions 12 , the expected incentives effect of the tax on its own would be zero. This is why it is important to analyze the entire system, including the effect of the subsidies towards abatement.
III. THEORETICAL MODEL
The objective of the paper is to measure the effect of the tax and subsidy on emissions;
in this section we develop a theoretical model that suggests the direction of the impact on emissions of the tax and subsidy and the factors that explain their effect.
In a general model, Fullerton and Wolverton (2000) and Fullerton and Mohr (2003) have shown that a subsidy to abatement increases emissions by lowering the cost of the polluting input, when there are no pigouvian taxes. 13 The regulation we study here comprises an emission tax combined with an abatement subsidy so we develop a model that takes into account the existence of an emission tax. The contribution of the model presented here is that it allows the regulator to use a pigouvian tax and that it includes a measure of the effectiveness of abatement. We then show that similarly to the results in Fullerton and
Wolverton (2000) and Fullerton and Mohr (2003) , abatement subsidies can lead to increased emissions.
Consider a plant using a polluting input in its production process (the polluting input will be energy from fossil fuel in the subsequent empirical analysis). To simplify the analysis, assume the plant produces a single output q(e) from a unit of energy input, e. The production function q(e) is increasing and concave in energy use: and . The plant is assumed to take the unit output price p as given. The firm's costs are a function of energy input and abatement, a, and denoted by: I(a) (1-s) 
We thus have two simultaneous equations of two endogenous variables -energy use e and abatement a -and two exogenous policy instruments: the emission tax t and the subsidy s.
this is a second order condition that has to be positive for a local maximum (See Appendix).
14 In addition, two conditions are useful for determining the impact of the tax and the subsidy on emissions:
Condition [3] says that abatement costs have to be sufficiently convex. 
The signs of the effect of the abatement subsidy are as expected. The subsidy increases abatement, and its indirect effect is to enable the firm to use more energy, all else equal. The effect of the tax on abatement and energy use is ambiguous. The emission tax has a positive effect on abatement if and only if the secondary effect of energy productivity exceeds the average emission tax per unit of energy in relation to total energy use. Intuitively, it is only when the firm's loss in the marginal productivity from reducing its energy use is high enough to exceed the cost of polluting energy use that the firm will prefer to invest in abatement rather than simply reducing the level of energy use. The sign of the tax's effect on energy use essentially depends on the curvature of the abatement investment function compared to the curvature of the technical abatement efficiency function ( ( ) a γ ). A sufficient condition for energy use to decrease in the emission tax is that abatement costs are sufficiently convex in the sense of condition [3] .
Given that emissions, z, equal ( ) e a γ , the effect on emissions can now be derived as: 
Note first that in this model where the externality arises from the use of polluting energy and where an abatement activity exists that can reduce the externality, the effect on emissions of both the tax and the subsidy are ambiguous (as shown in Baumol and Oates, 1988) . A standard assumption on the convexity of the cost function (condition [3] ) implies that the firm's energy use decreases with the tax rate. Normally, if abatement increases in the tax rate, then emissions will also decrease in the tax rate. There could be cases, though, where condition [4] does not hold and the impact of the tax rate on abatement is negative, i.e., the firm may invest less in abatement with a higher tax rate than in the optimal combination to reduce emissions through reduced energy use and abatement. This would be the case when a firm with low marginal productivity of energy use prefers to reduce energy use rather than invest in abatement. This negative effect on abatement then has to be outweighed by the direct negative impact of the tax on energy use. Sufficient conditions for emissions to decrease in the tax rate are [3] and [4] . The impact of the abatement subsidy on total emissions is ambiguous a priori, and whether it reduces overall emissions has to be tested empirically. It 
IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Our objective here is to measure the relative effect on emissions of the tax and the abatement subsidy. The empirical analysis is limited to the two major air pollutants, NO x and SO 2 , and three industrial sectors (iron and steel, coke, and chemistry). These three sectors are some of the main contributors to both NO x and SO 2 emissions and are sectors in which a significant number of subsidies has been granted (which is a necessary condition for identification of the impact of the subsidy on emissions).
Specification of the Model and Estimation Procedure
For a given pollutant (NO x or SO 2 ), the model describing emissions of plant i at time t is specified as follows: ε is the usual error term with assumed mean 0 and constant variance.
To account for the observed fact that plants emit both types of pollutants and that an end-of-pipe equipment can lower both types of emissions, we estimate the system combining both emissions equations:
where N and S respectively indicates emissions of NO x and SO 2 .
The decision of a plant to use a subsidized abatement technology (s it ) is likely to be endogenous in the model as some observable and unobservable plant characteristics which determine the decision of a plant might also have an impact on total emissions (e.g. the manager's concern about environmental issues). To overcome this possible selection bias problem, the common approach is to model the decision of the plant to use the subsidized abatement equipment. We only observe the decision of the plant to invest in the abatement equipment in period t but we assume from now on that a plant which invests in a new abatement equipment in period t will be using it from period t onwards, and we will have
t We assume that a plant is willing to invest in period t if the expected net benefit of this decision is positive in t but also in all subsequent years. The decision model at time t is thus written:
where represents the expected net benefit from using an abatement equipment. Z it are plant-specific characteristics which determine the firm's decision and which may have some The above model is estimated using a two-stage estimation procedure. In the first step we apply maximum-likelihood (ML) to estimate the probability that a plant uses an abatement equipment (equation [8] ). ML provides consistent estimates of the ν parameters which are used to compute the predicted probability, ( )
The estimated probability, , is then used as an explanatory variable in the two emissions equations to correct for possible endogeneity of the variable s, along the lines of Lee and Trost (1978) (see also Khanna and Damon 1999, for an application of the same two-stage procedure). Another endogeneity bias could arise from the correlation between the unobservable plant specific-effects (ˆi 
Data and Estimation Results
Our data set is an unbalanced panel from 1990 to 1998 of 226 French plants belonging to three industrial sectors (iron and steel, coke, and chemistry), with a total of 1,386
observations. The selected sectors are some of the main contributors to NO x and SO 2 emissions in France (see ADEME).
For each plant, data from ADEME contain: its geographical location, industry sector, the total amount of emissions as well as taxes paid to the agency, and whether an abatement subsidy had been granted. A search for plant ID numbers allowed us to match the existing plant-level data with data from the energy survey made by the French Ministry of Industry: the plant's consumption and purchases of ten different types of energy (among them electricity, coke, petroleum, gas) as well as the average price of each energy source. We compute total energy purchases and average annual weighted price of energy for each plant.
Additional information from the French Ministry of Industry has also been incorporated into the data set: total labor cost (i.e. total amount of wages), and value added, the latter being known at the firm-level only. For this variable, we have attributed the characteristic of the main company to its subsidiary plants.
All monetary amounts have been transformed into FF1990 and then into euros to facilitate a comparison with USD. 15 Prices were deflated with the price index of sales of industrial products (source: INSEE, the French National Statistics Institute).
Of the 226 plants recorded in our database, 62 were granted a subsidy in the 1990-98
period. The number of plants and the allocation of subsidies across the three sectors are reported in Table 1 .
[insert Table 1 here]
We observe (see Table 2 ) that the plants which decided to invest and apply for an abatement subsidy on average have higher emissions of NO x and SO 2 than non-investors.
Investing plants are furthermore characterized by high input expenses for energy and labour in general, and belong to firms producing items of high value added. These variables which relate to plant size and activity seem good candidates to discriminate between investors and non-investors and will thus be included as determinants of the plant's decision to invest in abatement. Total input expenses (for labour and energy) are preferred to input prices as they allow to control for the size of the plant. Note that the total value of energy purchases will be instrumented as it might be endogenous (from the theoretical model, energy consumption is shown to be influenced by the investment decision). 16 From the basic descriptive statistics, we expect that a plant with greater input expenses and a higher amount of emission tax payments will be more likely to invest in abatement. The ratio of self-financing capacity over value added measures the ability of the plant to self-finance its investments. This is particularly important here as only part of the total investment is covered by the subsidy. A higher ability to self-finance investment should increase the probability of the plant to invest in abatement technology. Furthermore, in order to account for regulatory pressure originating from the regulator observing exceedance of health-based air quality norms, we include in the model data on exceedance of air quality levels from IFEN, the French National Institute of the Environment. Since the data only exist for four years of the estimation period (1992, 1993, 1994, 1995) and do not exhibit much variation we use the average over these four years. The available data is regional and captures the average number of measurement points with at least one exceedance of an hour of the air quality standards for SO 2 (350 microgrammes/m 3 ) and NO x (200 microgrammes/m 3 ) respectively. We expect that the regulatory pressure on the plant would be greater in those regions where air quality standards are exceeded.
[insert Table 2 here]
Each of the two emissions equations is specified as a function of the predicted probability of investing in abatement technology, the tax rate, and plant characteristics. From the FOC derived from the maximization program of the plant (equations [1] and [2] ), plant characteristics should include input and output prices. However, information on input and output prices was very limited in our data and only the price of energy is available. To control for heterogeneity across plants, we use as extra regressors value added, the ratio of selffinancing capacity over value added, and total wages. 17 We also include year dummies to account for time-specific effects that would have affected all industrial sectors at the same time. 18 A specific time effect is included for the sector of coke which has been in decline from the mid-nineties when an agreement was signed between industry and the government that the coke sector should phase out its activities by 2007.
The estimation results for the Probit model are displayed in Table 3 . The overall fit of the model is satisfactory: the Likelihood Ratio test shows the overall significance of the parameters and the model predicts correctly 82% of the outcomes. Wald tests show that the total amount of taxes has an impact on the decision to invest which varies across sectors (pvalue corresponding to the null of equal parameters is 0.0559). Overall, these results show that plants of bigger size (i.e. plants with higher emissions and higher expenses in labour and energy) are more likely to use subsidized abatement equipment. Furthermore, a plant with a higher self-financing capacity (per unit of value added) is found more likely to adopt an abatement equipment, probably because only a small fraction of the investment is covered by the subsidy. Sectoral dummy variables indicate that plants from the sectors of coke and chemistry have a higher probability to invest in an abatement technology than plants from the iron and steel industry, all other things equal. The variables measuring exceedance of air quality standards in the region where the plant is located have positive signs, which may be because authorities put more pressure on the plants in those regions to reduce emissions.
[insert Table 3 here]
The emissions equations for NO x and SO 2 , in which all variables have been deviated from their time means, are estimated simultaneously using GLS (see Table 4 ). Different specifications have been tried (log-log, log-lin, lin-lin). Reported results correspond to the case of lin-lin emissions equations, which provided the best fit (as measured by R-square in the two equations, and the Akaike Information criterion). The overall fit is measured by the Rsquare, which is equal to 0.11 [resp. 0.16] for the NO x [resp. SO 2 ] equation. The lack of information on input and output prices (except for the price of energy) probably explains the relatively low fit of the models. Wald tests were run to check for equal effects of the different variables across sectors. These tests prove that sector-specific parameters should be specified for the tax and the probability to adopt an abatement equipment (see Table 4 ). Finally, the Breusch-Pagan (1980) chi-square statistic (a Lagrange Multiplier statistic) shows that both equations cannot be assumed independent.
[insert Table 4 here]
Even if the overall fit is low, the parameters of interest (i.e. those associated with the tax and the subsidy indicator) are significant for all three sectors. The pollution tax is found to negatively affect both NO x and SO 2 emissions, the marginal impact of the tax being stronger in the case of SO 2 (from -77 to -37 tonnes of SO 2 for a marginal increase of the tax rate for this pollutant, and from -30 to -20 tonnes in the case of NO x ). We attribute this to the French regulation's statutes for monitoring. Under the French regulation, firms could choose between using direct emissions monitoring or using emission factors to calculate emissions from fuel consumption data. For SO 2 emissions, the use of emission factors constitutes a good proxy for real emissions. For NO x emissions, on the contrary, accurate real emissions monitoring is more important since emissions vary strongly with fine-tuning of plant operations.
The parameters associated with the subsidy are all positive and highly significant. It thus seems that in this specific case, the input-use increasing effect of an abatement subsidy exceeded its direct pollution-reducing effect. For this to happen, the marginal technical abatement efficiency has to be quite small. In our sample, this seems to be the case, since primary emission reduction technologies were predominant. The Wald test rejects the null of equal effects across sectors, which emphasizes that the analysis has to allow for sectorspecific effects of the policy.
The time dummy variables should control for any autonomous technical improvement in the emission factors. They are significant only for NO x emissions, for which there is a decreasing trend. For the coke sector we find in addition that emissions tended to decrease less than for the sectors of iron and steel, and chemistry. Most likely it reflects the fact that this sector should have less incentives for emissions abatement since its activities should be phased out anyway by 2007.
Energy price is not significant in any of the models, contrary to what would have been expected from the theoretical model. We use calculated average prices, though, which may not be a good proxy for the energy price actually faced by the firm. Among the other variables included in the model to control for plant heterogeneity, the variable measuring the plant's self-financing capacity as well as the amount of total wages are found significant.
The above estimation results can be used to derive the elasticity of emissions with respect to the tax as well as the overall effect on emissions of the tax and the subsidy, for each sector and each pollutant (see Table 5 ). In each case, the elasticity is computed at the sample mean. The overall estimated effect of the tax is computed, for each sector and each pollutant, as the product of the corresponding estimated coefficient (α in model [6] ) with the average emission tax over the period. The overall estimated effect of the subsidy is directly obtained from the estimated parameter γ (see model [6] ). The 95% confidence interval is reported in all cases. Estimated emission tax elasticities vary from -2.67 to -0.59 in the case of NO x , and from -2.26 to -0.21 in the case of SO 2 . Plants in the coke industry were the least responsive to the tax. Estimated effects show that generally the (positive) effect of the subsidies outweighed the (negative) effect of the tax. Hence our empirical analysis shows that the combined tax/subsidy system in general increased polluting emissions in the three sectors considered.
We believe that this result is explained by the low level of the French air pollution tax compared to the levels of abatement subsidies as well as a low effectiveness of the subsidized technologies, which led the input-use increasing effect of an abatement subsidy to dominate the pollution-reducing effect of the subsidy.
[insert Table 5 here]
V. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY PERSPECTIVES
The objective of the paper was to make an ex post evaluation of the effectiveness of one form of environmental taxation, an earmarked air pollution tax. We gathered original data on the French tax on air pollution and emissions of SO 2 and NO x . The revenues of the French tax on air pollution were refunded to the polluters through subsidies for investment in pollution abatement technology.
A theoretical model was derived to describe the behaviour of a representative plant under the French system of taxes and subsidies. From this theoretical framework, we built a system of equations to estimate the impact of the combined tax/subsidy system on the level of emissions, while controlling for endogeneity of the plant decision to invest in air pollution abatement. We used a two-stage estimation procedure on a plant-level database on emissions, firm characteristics, taxes paid and subsidies received.
The results indicate that the overall effectiveness of a tax/subsidy policy like the French air pollution tax system during the nineties can be questioned. For all three sectors in our sample, the tax had a significant negative impact on emissions, but the reduction in emissions was larger for SO 2 than for NO x emissions. We attribute this difference in the impact to the French regulation's monitoring procedures for emissions. All else equal, the higher the total amount of pollution taxes paid, the higher the probability that the plant applied for an abatement subsidy. The effect of the combined subsidy, however, was found to increase total emissions significantly and to an extent that generally dwarfed the negative impact of the tax. We believe that this result is explained by the low level of the French air pollution tax compared to the levels of abatement subsidies as well as a low effectiveness of the subsidized technologies, which led the input-use increasing effect of an abatement subsidy to dominate the pollution-reducing effect of the subsidy.
In a general policy context this does not mean that earmarking of environmental tax revenues should be abandoned as a means of overcoming industry resistance to taxes. The efficiency loss created by the refunding of revenues in a non lump sum manner should be carefully weighted against the likelihood of getting a pigouvian tax implemented. It is quite likely that earmarking of tax revenues is necessary in order to overcome political obstacles towards taxes. Fredriksson (1997b) develops a political economy model with industry and environmental lobby groups to explain the simultaneous use of emission taxes and abatement subsidies. Albeit in a very different political economy model than the model used here, Fredriksson (1997a) reaches a similar conclusion that pollution abatement subsidies can increase pollution if the output-increasing effect of the subsidy exceeds its pollution-reducing effect. In particular, he derives more subtle effects of the abatement subsidy on the pollution tax rate due to lobby interactions with the government. Here, our interest is in the effect of the tax and abatement subsidy on emissions, rather than explaining why the policy was instituted in the first place. We note, though, that the low effectiveness of the French tax/subsidy on air pollution probably was due to the relatively low tax rate compared to the level of the abatement subsidies. Nevertheless, we would argue that there are also fundamental institutional features of the regulation that would need to be addressed and borne in mind for the design of any environmental tax scheme where revenues are refunded to polluters.
In the first place, monitoring of real emissions is a necessary prerequisite to keep the link between the tax base and emissions, in particular as regards emissions of NO x . It is instructive, in this regard, to compare the French tax on NO x with the Swedish refunded emission payment on NO x from industrial sources. The refunding of the revenue of the Swedish NO x charge was motivated in part by the requirement to install costly monitoring equipment, for the reason that it is not simply the installation of abatement equipment that matters but its fine tuning and continued adjustment to the production process (as NO x emissions depend not only on the fuel input but also on process factors such as the temperature and oxygen content of the combustion chamber). Precise monitoring equipment encourages the use and fine tuning of the production process to minimize emissions. The other important design feature concerns the mechanism by which the tax revenues are refunded to the tax-payers. Under the French regulation, tax revenues were used to subsidize abatement investments and the selection of projects was made following an administrative procedure. Such a rule has at least three drawbacks. 
